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1. Introduction  
Behavioural economics (BE) has become a buzzword in UK policy circles. BE is about how 
individuals often make choices that are apparently not entirely rational in the sense that they 
do not maximise their utility. The positive implications of BE have been developed in 
academic research over many decades, but its potential to improve regulation was 
popularised by Thaler and Sunstein in their 2008 book called ‘Nudge’.2 They argue that much 
could be achieved by changing the way choices are presented to individuals (‘choice 
architecture’) and that this is an attractive form of ‘soft paternalism’ that does not impede the 
liberty of individuals to make the choices they want. While this is a controversial view to 
some, it proved attractive to politicians especially in the heat of the financial crisis and the 
shadow that recession has cast over the market system. BE reached UK public attention in 
2010 with the creation of the ‘10 Downing Street Behavioural Insights Team’, widely known 
as the Nudge Unit, which aimed to use the insights of BE and psychology to improve 
government policy and services. This paper focuses on the relevance of BE to competition 
and competition policy enforcement. 
Many of the academic insights of BE had long been noticed less formally by marketing 
executives, and business strategies have developed to exploit the cracks in rational choice. 
For some years, consumer protection work and market investigations by the UK Office of 
Fair Trading (OFT) and Competition Commission (CC) recognised this, but not in the 
explicit context of BE. However, the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) and 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) have recently become much more focused on the explicit 
use of BE, particularly in relation to financial product markets. Indeed, the UK regulators 
lead the world in new applications of BE to regulation and competition policy. This is 
substantially related to the UK’s distinctive markets regime which encourages intervention in 
markets which are not working well because of features that have an ‘adverse effect on 
competition’. Certain aspects of consumer behaviour, and possibly also of the behaviour of 
firms, can constitute such a ‘feature’. It is possible that other aspects of competition policy, in 
particular the abuse of dominance, could also be subjected to the lens of BE (eg the 
presentation of results by a dominant search engine), but the explicit application of BE to Art 
102 TFEU/Chapter II CA98 has not yet arisen. 
The rest of this article is organised as follows. In the next section, we summarise the current 
views of the CMA and FCA. The third section provides more detail on what distinguishes BE 
from standard economics and the fourth section explains why it is often thought to be 
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particularly important for financial markets.3 Examples of the analytical approach recently 
used by the UK authorities are given in the fifth section, and the sixth section concludes. 
2. Behavioural economics as seen by the FCA and CMA 
The FCA has a new operational objective to promote competition and an important vehicle 
for achieving this will be through market studies.4 Aligned with this, the FCA has been 
explicit about its intention to apply BE to its economic analysis. Its first published occasional 
paper was specifically on this topic and Martin Wheatley (Chief Executive of the FCA) has 
been strong in his advocacy. In April 2013, he wrote:5  
‘A rapidly growing literature on behavioural economics shows that some errors 
made by consumers are persistent and predictable. This raises the prospect of 
firms designing business models that do not focus on competing on price and 
quality. Behavioural economics enables regulators to intervene in markets more 
effectively, and in new ways, to counter such business models and secure better 
outcomes for consumers.’  
His enthusiasm for BE has only increased. He recently wrote6 that ‘behavioural economics is 
quickly becoming a game changer. Not just for firms, not just for consumers, but potentially 
for the shape of regulation for many years to come’ and7 that ‘behavioural economics … 
offer[s] policy makers the possibility that, in future, far more regulatory action can have a 
meaningful and positive societal contribution’. Indeed, he envisages the FCA’s scope to 
include applications to large and sophisticated financial firms:8 ‘[The FCA is investigating] 
whether behavioural economics can offer … insights into how individuals within 
organisations behave and respond to regulation.’ 
The CMA has also become more explicit about how it will consider consumers’ behavioural 
biases and firms’ potential to exploit these. Its general approach is similar to the FCA.9 It 
observes that ‘consumers may exhibit behavioural biases’ and ‘consumer decision-making is 
not always fully rational’. Decisions may be limited by, for example: ‘the time consumers 
have available to make decisions’; ‘consumers’ ability to process and compute the 
information’; and ‘how things are presented’. The CMA considers that ‘concerns may arise 
where firms exploit such biases to create or worsen blockages in accessing, assessing and 
acting on information’ (emphasis added). This is a useful bit of alliteration because it 
highlights the decision-making stages of searching, coming to a decision as to the best choice, 
and actually buying or switching provider. Behavioural economists have looked closely at 
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each stage.10  
While the CMA’s use of BE may span a broader range of industries (for example, the energy 
sector in its current market investigation), there is already a major track record of cases in 
which BE has been applied to financial markets in varying degrees. The CMA is currently 
undertaking (or has recently completed) market inquiries into a range of retail financial 
markets: retail banking; payday lending; and private motor insurance. Earlier market studies / 
investigations into financial markets implemented remedies addressing behavioural biases, 
even if not always identified explicitly as such, for example: extended warranties on domestic 
electrical goods;11 Northern Ireland personal current account (PCA) banking;12 and payment 
protection insurance (PPI).13 The FCA has undertaken / launched six market studies: 
investment and corporate banking; credit cards; retirement income; cash savings; general 
insurance add-ons; SME (small and medium sized enterprises) banking (joint CMA/ FCA 
market study leading to CMA retail banking market inquiry). Figure 1 provides a 
visualisation of how the trend is increasing. 
 
Figure 1: Recent milestones in financial product market studies/ investigations by the CMA 
and FCA 
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The application of BE will undoubtedly feature heavily in the competition analysis of 
financial markets in the coming years. Firstly, the post financial crisis reappraisal of the 
efficiency of deregulated financial markets means that an increasing number of market 
studies / investigations are being undertaken in financial markets. Secondly, as developed in 
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the fourth section of this article, BE is particularly relevant for the analysis of financial 
markets. Thirdly, the FCA’s new operational objective and new concurrent competition 
powers open up new ways to apply BE. Fourthly, the leadership of the key regulators is 
committed to enforcement using the insights of BE. We expect this to be a controversial 
journey because there is only limited consensus over the robustness of certain behavioural 
quirks and great care is required to design appropriate remedies, and in particular remedies 
that aim to modify consumer choices.  
3. What is behavioural economics? 
In order to understand what additional insights to the analysis of markets are derived from 
BE, it is important to understand the alternative, which is rational choice theory. Rational 
choice sits at the core of mainstream economics and is the foundation of our traditional 
understanding of how competition works to the benefit of consumers. In the current context, 
we can focus on two axioms of rationality which underpin rational choice theory.  
● Rational individuals have coherent preferences. This means that they know what they 
like and there is a degree of stability (eg over a given time period) in their preferences. 
Given these preferences, alternative consumption bundles can be ranked in order of 
their utility (ie the value they generate to consumers).  
● Rational individuals have the ability to make choices so as best to satisfy their 
preferences. This means that they have the ability to maximise their utility subject to 
product prices and their budget constraint.  
These axioms underpin the main formalisation of how competition directs resources to where 
they maximise welfare – rational consumers know what they like and they use price 
information to make the best of their limited budgets.  Competition results in prices that 
reflect costs so resources are allocated efficiently. 
Both axioms have been challenged by behavioural economists. Individuals who act 
‘behaviourally’ do not use price information optimally (eg they may be influenced by the way 
essentially the same choices are presented to them) and they may not even have coherent 
preferences (eg they may persistently ‘give in to temptation’ even when their preferences are 
quite different at any time other than when they actually make their choice). Non-rational 
behaviour can be due to, for example, cognitive limitations in processing information, bias in 
appraising risk, or inconsistent preferences.  There is no simple dichotomy between rational 
and behavioural individuals. Each of us is likely to act ‘rationally’ in one situation and 
‘behaviourally’ in another.14  
Rational choice theory can embrace some randomness in consumer choices, so BE is not 
about random mistakes. Instead, it identifies systematic biases in decision-making by 
‘behavioural’ choosers. These biases are predictable and can, in principle, be manipulated by 
firms. This potential for manipulation sharpens the case for intervention, but does not make it 
necessary because it remains possible that the market is self-correcting or that intervention 
may make things worse.  
There is often a confusion about what is ‘rational’ and what is ‘behavioural’. For example, 
some consumers do not actively search for the best deal or do not switch despite identifying a 
cheaper product. This should not automatically be taken to mean that such consumers are 
irrational because they may simply expect search or switching to be too costly (eg they 
consider they have better things to do with their time). However, if such costs are small 
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compared to the gains to the consumer, there may be a systematic behavioural bias at work. 
In practical policy enforcement, there is probably little to be gained by dwelling on an 
academic debate identifying the boundaries between rational and behavioural. 
Small firms may also be subject to behavioural biases, particularly in their purchasing 
decisions.15 This is because they can face severe time constraints, fluctuating and uncertain 
requirements, and have other priorities on the production and sales side of their businesses. 
This is fairly uncontroversial. However, the FCA is now considering the application of BE to 
much larger firms (eg corporate clients purchasing investment and corporate banking 
services).16 The context is that financial institutions have complex banking needs and the 
FCA is concerned that they may be prone to biases in their choice of provider. However, 
behavioural biases in large, sophisticated firms cannot simply be implied from the existing 
literature on individual biases. Such hypotheses will require a thorough assessment. 
In a particular market, there may be a mix of consumers with some choosing rationally and 
others behaviourally. In such cases, we can ask ‘what is the likely market outcome’? Do 
behavioural consumers free ride on rational choosers who have engaged fully with the market 
(eg a sufficient number of rational switchers can make a firm’s demand sufficiently elastic to 
keep prices low for all consumers)? Or do ‘exploited’ behavioural choosers cross-subsidise 
rational consumers who switch frequently between the best deals (eg teaser rates in some 
retail financial products)? Identifying the balance is a serious challenge for regulators and 
academic research is still in the early days of analysing this problem.17 
As with other justifications for regulation, exploitation of behavioural choices by a firm’s 
customers need not be by object (ie the result of the deliberate design of a business practice). 
It could be by effect (ie a side-effect of some other purpose or the evolution of business 
practices which have proved successful over time). Either way, there may be justification for 
an intervention that helps individuals better to satisfy their (coherent) preferences. It is much 
more controversial to intervene on the basis that consumers do not know their own 
preferences.  Most of the emphasis of BE research relevant to regulation and competition 
policy relates to the difficulties individuals have in making the ‘right choice’, accepting that 
the individual is ultimately the best judge of her own preferences. This is also the focus of 
this article. 
4. Why is behavioural economics considered important for financial 
markets? 
Some systematic biases identified by BE have been identified by regulators as particularly 
important for financial services. The following is not intended to be a fully comprehensive 
list, nor should it be considered that these behavioural traits are applicable in all 
circumstances, but it is intended to help explain the current focus on BE in regulation and 
competition policy enforcement in financial markets.18 
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Cognitive limitations 
First, individuals’ cognitive limitations mean that it is difficult to analyse complex products, 
and infrequent purchases make it difficult to learn from experience. Furthermore, individuals 
have a limited attention span for detail and sometimes use simple heuristics to make 
decisions. This can make choices dependent on the way they are framed. Choices can be 
anchored to a particular outcome by making a particular choice prominent (eg buy the first 
product that comes up on a search engine). Many financial products are inherently complex 
for many individuals and they are difficult or tedious to analyse. In part this is because they 
are only a means to an end, and the pleasure of choice bears little comparison with 
purchasing clothes, music or cars. Some financial products (eg purchase of annuities) also 
permit little learning from past mistakes. 
Financial markets where the FCA and CMA are considering whether these issues arise 
include the following:  
● Credit cards: The FCA is considering whether consumers may have limited attention, 
which may make them less likely to assess all the product features when making a 
decision and more likely to focus on those features that are prominent in marketing 
material.19  
● Retirement income: The FCA undertook a behavioural experiment20 which found that 
presenting annuities and alternative income drawdown strategies in different frames can 
significantly alter an individual’s relative preference for these retirement income 
products.  It found that, when faced with the same underlying choice between an 
annuity and drawdown alternatives, consumers, on average, preferred the annuity under 
a consumption frame (ie budget available to spend each year), but preferred drawdown 
alternatives under an investment frame.21  
● Payday lending: The CMA found that variation in product features and pricing 
structures makes it difficult for customers to identify the best loan for them, with the 
headline APR being of limited use and existing price-comparison websites being 
inadequate.22  
● Wholesale sector competition review: The FCA considers that limited clarity over 
price and quality of services may make it difficult for corporate clients to assess 
whether they are getting value for money.23 
Bias in appraising risk 
Secondly, individuals often exhibit systematic biases in appraising risk. A greater weight than 
is objectively justifiable may be placed on very low probability events (eg likelihood of 
product breakdown). Individuals can also exhibit an overconfidence in their ability to make 
the right predictions, despite objective evidence otherwise. They may be prone to over-
extrapolation and herding (ie following what they observe others doing). Most financial 
products are fundamentally related to risk (eg insurance, choice of savings products) which 
may make them susceptible to these biases. 
Financial markets where the FCA and CMA are considering whether these issues arise 
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include the following:  
● Retail banking: The CMA is considering whether consumers may underestimate the 
probability of going into overdraft when choosing their bank/ account type and thus 
may not focus on overdraft charges. The CMA is also examining whether consumers 
may underestimate the likelihood of keeping large credit balances on their current 
account and thus may forgo interest on such credit balances by retaining their funds in a 
non- or low-interest account.24  
● Credit cards: The FCA is considering whether consumers may be overconfident, 
which may lead them to underestimate the likelihood of incurring interest charges and 
fees.25  
● Payday lending: The CMA found that customers prioritise speed of access to credit but 
are very uncertain as to who may be willing to lend to them, which biases them towards 
borrowing from the first lender to accept them.26 
Non-standard preferences 
Thirdly, individuals may have non-standard preferences. They may have a bias towards 
having something ‘now’ (compared to, say, tomorrow) and are willing to pay 
disproportionately for it (compared to a one-day delay in consumption at any point in the 
future). This is sometimes known as present bias (or hyperbolic discounting). Another 
standard behavioural bias is status quo bias, in which individuals tend to stick with the status 
quo (eg if I have an apple and am offered a swap for an orange, I will reject it, but if I start 
with the orange I will reject a swap for the apple). This may inhibit rational switching. These 
potential biases have been considered in the context of financial markets, since many 
financial products involve trade-offs between the present and the future, or an on-going 
default provider.  
Financial markets where the FCA is considering whether these issues arise include the 
following:  
● Credit cards: The FCA is considering whether, when choosing a credit card, 
consumers may focus disproportionately on features that bring immediate benefits (eg 
an introductory rate) and not consider the overall cost of credit.27  
● Cash savings: The FCA found that consumers’ savings accounts opened long ago pay 
lower interest rates than those opened more recently.28  
5. Possible concerns about firms exploiting behavioural biases 
This range of behavioural biases potentially affecting consumers of financial products has 
raised concerns that they might be exploited in financial business practices, either by object 
or effect. These concerns can take different forms. For example, cognitive limitations could, 
in principle, be exploited by the provision of either too much (irrelevant) or too little 
(relevant) information. This could potentially muddy the choice between complex or 
infrequently purchased products, and so may weaken the incentive for firms to compete. 
Opaque prices and drip pricing (ie where a headline price is subject to necessary add-on 
prices as the consumer progresses through the purchase) similarly could in principle make 
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accurate comparisons difficult. In its wholesale sector competition review 2014/15, the FCA 
considered that the bundling of a range of wholesale banking services might make 
comparisons difficult even for large firms.29  
A biased focus on very low probability events could, in principle, drive higher prices for 
insurance products designed specifically to cover such events, especially when sold at the 
same time as the associated product (eg PPI, extended warranties). As the FCA found in its 
general insurance add-ons market study, add-on purchases could be ‘anchored’ by the use of 
pre-ticked boxes to establish a default (eg ‘optional’ insurance).30 In its credit cards market 
study, the FCA is considering whether some consumers may use the minimum repayment as 
a reference point when deciding how much of their credit card balance to pay off.31 
In relation to non-standard preferences, ‘introductory’ or ‘teaser’ interest rates could be 
disproportionately attractive to savers or borrowers subject to present bias, and status quo 
bias could potentially then leave them with an unattractive financial product once the time-
limited rate expires. Even this partial list provides a large agenda of potential concerns that 
may be investigated. 
Finally, we add the important proviso that regulators should not jump to conclusions about 
adverse effects just because a behavioural bias has been found in immediate consumer 
responses. There is evidence that consumers can and do learn when they have sufficient 
incentive, and interventions that remove such incentives can be harmful over time.32 
In conclusion, the BE literature indicates that consumers do not always act rationally and 
some may exhibit systematic biases in their decision-making. The nature of financial 
products means that consumers may in principle be particularly prone to such behavioural 
biases in financial services markets, which raises a concern from regulators that these biases 
may be exploited by financial services providers. Regulators have not limited their concerns 
to final consumers, but also to SMEs and, despite limited support in the literature, possibly 
even to larger firms. As a result, BE is increasingly being used by competition authorities in 
their analysis across all financial services markets. In implementing their analysis, regulators 
need to be aware of consumer learning and supply responses that can control any short-term 
problems. They should also be wary of extrapolating academic BE findings for individuals 
beyond SMEs to much larger firms. Their current approach is developed in the next section. 
6. The UK authorities’ analytical approach to the application of 
behavioural economics 
BE is relevant to several areas of a competition authority’s work. First, as we mentioned 
earlier, BE is relevant to the identification of features that may harm competition in a market. 
This may relate to consumer behaviour and/ or to any practices or strategies adopted by firms 
which may be seen to exploit such behaviour. For this reason BE is relevant and already 
being used in relation to the definition of some Theories of Harm (ToH) in market studies and 
investigations. Secondly, and relatedly, BE is naturally relevant to the assessment of a ToH 
based on BE. Thirdly, BE may be needed in the design and evaluation of remedies. While 
these issues are clearly interrelated and to some degree overlapping, it is helpful to consider 
                                                 
29
  FCA, Wholesale sector competition review, n 16, above. 
30
  FCA, General insurance add-ons: Final report – confirmed findings of the market study (July 2014). 
31
  FCA, Credit card market study, n 17, above, at para 4.61. 
32
  For a convincing example taken from US health insurance, see J Ketcham, C Lucarelli, E Miravete and MC 
Roebuck, ‘Sinking, Swimming, or Learning to Swim in Medicare Part D?’ (2012) 102(6) American Economic Review 2639. 
9 
 
them separately.  
The use of behavioural economics in identifying features that may harm competition 
The FCA and the CMA have both set out the high level methodology that they would adopt 
in applying BE. The FCA has set out three steps:33 
● Step 1: Identify and prioritise risks to consumers. The FCA has suggested a set of 
early warning indicators to highlight potentially problematic consumer and firm 
behaviours and product features. Warning indicators that the FCA has identified 
include: firms cross-subsidising groups of consumers; products with ‘too good to be 
true’ headline prices; consumers who purchase infrequently so have little opportunity to 
learn. The FCA has said that in prioritising risks, it needs to consider the size of the 
problem and distributional effects. 
● Step 2: Understand root causes of problems. When analysing problems, the FCA has 
stated that it needs to develop alternative explanations on the underlying cause and then 
build evidence to discriminate between the alternatives (eg how consumers choose in 
different settings, their awareness of essential product information and their self-
reported needs and objectives). It has said that it must investigate whether consumers 
are making mistakes, and if so which biases may be the cause. 
● Step 3: Design effective interventions. There are four ways in which the FCA could 
solve behavioural problems, ordered from least to most interventionist: provide better 
information, change the choice environment (ie how product choices are framed), 
control product distribution (eg the channels through which products can be sold), or 
control products (eg ban products that appear to be designed to exploit consumers). 
When choosing between different interventions, the FCA needs to assess their costs and 
benefits. 
The CMA has adopted a similar approach to the assessment of consumers’ behavioural biases 
and their potential exploitation by firms.34 As mentioned above the approach focuses on 
ensuring that consumers are able to access, assess and act on information relevant to their 
choices. However the CMA has also flagged that the understanding of the root causes of any 
biases needs to be grounded in ‘a very granular understanding of how individual markets 
work and how consumers behave in the particular market context that they face’.35 The CMA 
also acknowledges that a range of tools have emerged (especially on the internet) to assist 
consumers’ decision-making process (eg search engine results, price-comparison websites).36 
However the CMA is keen to explore any behavioural issues that might adversely affect 
consumers online and has two ongoing calls for information on the use of consumer data37 
and on online reviews and endorsements38. Overall, the CMA states that it ‘will focus on 
areas where there is evidence of widespread or endemic practices that negatively impact on 
consumer decision-making or choice’.39 
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The use of behavioural economics in assessing market outcomes  
Faced with the problem of consumer behavioural biases, regulators need to focus on 
understanding consumer behaviour in assessing market outcomes and testing/ designing 
effective interventions in the market. BE is increasingly influencing the tools used by 
regulators in market studies/ inquiries. In particular, this influence is particularly evident in 
relation to the use of behavioural experiments and consumer surveys:  
● Regulators (including the OFT, FCA and Ofcom) have started to use behavioural 
experiments in the assessment of consumers’ behaviour and market outcomes, and, 
ultimately, in testing whether potential remedies are likely to be effective. For example, 
in its retirement income market study40 the FCA used a behavioural experiment to 
explore how information on potential retirement income options is presented/ framed to 
consumers and the impact of framing on consumer choice.41 On the basis of this 
experiment, the FCA concluded that consumers are highly sensitive to how the options 
are presented/ framed. It recommended that both firms and the new pension guidance 
service (Pension Wise) take into account framing effects when designing tools to 
support consumer decision-making. 
● Consumer surveys undertaken by regulators now include more questions on 
behavioural aspects of consumer choice. This is in addition to longer standing practices 
of applying BE to the design of surveys themselves, to ensure that answers are not 
biased. 
These examples are important in highlighting areas where the FCA and CMA are already 
drawing from BE in terms both of their findings (eg the existence of framing effects in the 
design of surveys) and their toolkit (eg experiments). Both these areas are clearly important 
in determining the solidity of the evidence base and the conclusions drawn from it. One 
challenge facing both regulators and the parties to their investigations is to ensure that these 
insights and tools are applied correctly. This is not always straightforward, as for example, 
the design of experiments can be important in driving results and needs to be carefully 
considered ahead of their interpretation.42 
These issues are likely to become even more prominent in case the use of such tools expands. 
Experimental economics (on which much of BE is founded) has been used in economics to 
study a variety of issues beyond the existence of behavioural biases in consumer choice,43 for 
example the drivers of coordinated behaviour. While this is an area where the regulators have 
not yet ventured (and perhaps never will) it will be important to consider in each individual 
case the scope and robustness of the methodologies employed.  
Examples of remedies applied by UK authorities to address behavioural problems 
As mentioned earlier, BE is relevant to identification of specific features that may reduce 
competition. This implies that it should also play a role in the design of appropriate remedies 
and specifically on the assessment of a remedy’s effectiveness.  
Examples of the types of remedies introduced by the FCA and CMA to address behavioural 
problems include measures aimed at improving the presentation of information (in the 
                                                 
40
  FCA, Retirement income market study, n 19, above . 
41
  FCA, Does the framing of retirement income options matter?, n 18, above. 
42
  For a deep look at this issue, see Nicholas Bardsley, Robin Cubitt, Graham Loomes, Peter Moffatt, Chris Starmer 
and Robert Sugden, Experimental Economics: Rethinking the Rules (Princeton University Press), 2009. 
43
  See Charles R Plott and Vernon L Smith (eds), Handbook of Experimental Economics Results (2008), Vol 1, at pp 1–
1098, I1–I32. <AQ Is this reference OK as shown here?> 
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CMA’s payday lending market inquiry44 as well as in the market studies on cash savings45 
and retirement income46 by the FCA). They also include measures to improve switching (in 
the FCA’s cash savings market study47). Furthermore, they have included measures to change 
the context in which products are sold, for example by banning the sale of complementary 
products (in the CC’s PPI market inquiry48) or by introducing a deferred opt-in period (in the 
FCA’s general insurance add-ons market study49). 
Measures to improve the provision of information and to facilitate switching may appear to 
be relatively uncontroversial. However it is important that the regulator understands the way 
in which individuals access, assess and act on information so their choices provide the right 
incentives to make markets work better in satisfying consumer preferences.  
The risks are greater when it comes to more intrusive remedies (eg on how products are sold). 
Poorly designed remedies may exacerbate problems or lead to other sources of consumer 
harm. For example, a restriction on cross-selling products may help smaller specialist firms at 
the expense of some consumers who rationally prefer to source multiple products from the 
same company. Point of sale restrictions on insurance at the time of purchasing the insured 
item may leave some individuals uninsured because they will not get round to comparing 
alternative insurance providers and buying once they get home. A free overdraft facility 
designed as a remedy to overcome fears of payments problems when switching banks, may 
backfire if behavioural consumers use their free overdraft and are drawn into debt.50 The 
response of firms must also be considered as small changes in the implementation of a 
remedy may have negative side effects.51 
Overall, behavioural remedies need careful analysis to ‘get right’. Remedies which restrict 
the range of strategies available to firms carry a particular danger that they may do more 
harm than good, and it is highly unlikely that ‘structural’ remedies could be appropriate. 
7. Conclusions  
In conclusion, BE is becoming an increasingly important part of standard competition 
assessment by the FCA and CMA. BE is being used to frame and test theories of harm and is 
influencing the tools used by the FCA and CMA to understand consumer behaviour and 
market outcomes and test the likely effectiveness of possible remedies.  
The appeal of BE is understandable as it provides insights that can help facilitate the choices 
of consumers that drive good outcomes in markets. This suggests the application of some 
aspects of BE may broaden in the future as the use of BE tools in surveys (which are used in 
a number of mergers and anti-trust cases) or experiments becomes more widespread. The 
                                                 
44
  CMA, Payday lending market investigation, n 20, above. 
45
  FCA, Cash savings market study report, n 26, above. 
46
  FCA, Retirement income market study: Final report – confirmed findings and remedies (March 2015). 
47
  FCA, Cash savings market study report, n 26, above. 
48
  CC, Market investigation into payment protection insurance, n 13, above. 
49
  FCA, General insurance add-ons: Final report – confirmed findings of the market study, n 28, above.. 
50
  This was a remedy used in the Northern Ireland PCA Banking Market Investigation.  
51
  For example, the CMA has observed that ‘if firms have an incentive to create complex price structures (confusopoly) 
in order to generate consumer inertia – rabbits in headlight come to mind – then regulators may impose simplified pricing to 
cater for consumers’ bounded rationality. However, care is needed: reducing complexity may harm consumers because if 
consumers have different preferences, relatively complex offers might be optimal. Simplified pricing may also facilitate tacit 
collusion.’ See David Currie speech, ‘Homo economicus and Homo sapiens’, n 10, above. 
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influence of BE in identifying and formulating theories of harm may also broaden beyond the 
scope of market inquiries, for example in abuse of dominance cases and more generally in 
understanding how market outcomes are influenced by limitations in the rationality of 
consumers’ and firms’ decision-making.  
This new environment presents challenges to regulators and parties to ensure the tools and 
insights from BE are applied correctly, particularly as they can be sensitive to detailed 
economic context. There are risks of over-intervention and unintended harm in markets 
where BE is applied incorrectly.  
 
